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Greenland  
– from autonomy to (In)dependence
Matters associated with the current development of Greenland can be viewed from 
the perspective of internal relations in the Kingdom of Denmark. Nevertheless, the 
processes unfolding on the world’s largest island seem to be much more profound. The 
island’s strategic location, advancing climate change and reports of deposits of mineral 
resources all make Greenland a subject of interest to more than just researchers of the 
Arctic. The formation process of the island’s statehood exemplifies how the principle 
of self-determination of nations can be applied. The significance of this process can 
hardly be exaggerated, especially given the independence movements that have re-
cently emerged (for instance in Catalonia and Scotland).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of development of Greenland’s 
autonomy, especially vis-à-vis the Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009, which 
ensures that decisions on the future status of the island will be made by the people of 
Greenland. This study also aims to discuss the relations between Denmark and Green-
land in terms of post-colonial relations between the former metropolis/colonizer and 
the island, outlining also the discourse on independence in Greenland. Finally, the 
paper analyzes the popular claim that the anticipated proceeds from mineral extrac-
tion will lay foundations for Greenland to become independent from Danish subsidies, 
thereby allowing the island to become a sovereign entity.
The Kingdom of Denmark is a unique example of a unitary state composed of three 
clearly distinct components: Denmark and Greenland and the Faroe Islands, both of 
which enjoy considerable autonomy. The Home Rule Acts of individual Nordic ter-
ritories have been designed so as to ensure that the unity of the state is retained, while 
recognizing and respecting the diverse characters of its components. The main reason 
behind this was to give power regarding matters concerning these territories exclusive-
ly, and the resulting accountability, to their residents, in recognition of the exceptional 
historical, cultural, ethnic and geographical positions of these territories.
From 1814 until the mid-20th century, Greenland was a colony directly governed by 
the Danish government. In 1954, the island was included in the Kingdom of Denmark 
as a district (amt), thereby terminating the period of colonial dependence. In 1973, 
work commenced to prepare self-government for Greenland within the Kingdom of 
Denmark. An agreement was worked out and adopted both by the Danish parliament 
and the island residents, and on May 1, 1979, the Greenland Home Rule Act came into 
force. In late 20th century, the community of Greenland (as well as the Faroe Islands) 
concluded that the Home Rule Act had performed its intended function and respon-
108	 Tomasz	BRAŃKA	
sibilities had been transferred in line with its provisions. However, the majority of 
Greenlandic political forces began to perceive the framework of the Home Rule Act as 
excessively rigid and detrimental to the further advancement of autonomy. A new Act 
on Greenland Self-Government came into force in 2009 and considerably expanded 
the powers of Greenland’s government.
Greenland is the world’s largest island, with a surface area of 2,166,086 km2 and 
55,800 residents (as of January 2017). The population of its capital, Nuuk, is 17,600. 
Legislative power on the island is exercised by the local parliament (Inatsisartut) of 
31 members, and executive power is exercised by the government (Naalakkersuisut). 
A considerable proportion of the island’s budget is ensured by an annual subsidy from 
Denmark to the tune of nearly DKK 3.7 billion, which accounts for nearly 25% of 
Greenland’s GDP (Greenland in Figures, 2017: 7).
tHe WorK and fIndInGS of tHe commISSIon  
on Self-GoVernance
Greenland’s pursuit of a redefined relationship with Denmark found expression in the 
Commission on Self-Governance, established in 1999. The Commission’s mandate in-
cluded drafting a report on the opportunities to develop the independence of Greenland 
within the Danish community on the basis of balance between powers and responsi-
bilities (Terms, 2003). Right from the beginning, it was clearly stressed that the Com-
mission did not have the goal of paving the way to independence, but rather of seeking 
solutions which would enable Greenland to expand its powers within the framework 
of the United Kingdom of Denmark. The Commission’s Chairman, Jakob Janussen ad-
ditionally stressed a frequently disregarded argument against independence of Green-
land. In his opinion, a territory with such a strategic location as Greenland, with such 
a large surface and such a limited population, will always depend on another state.1
Particular importance in the Commission’s work was assigned to the matter of 
Greenland exerting greater influence on foreign and security policy, and that of reduc-
ing the dependence of the island’s economy on Danish subsidies. Practically from the 
beginning of home rule, Greenlandic politicians have been trying to solve the paradox 
whereby the more Greenland wanted to become independent from the mother state (by 
way of taking over additional responsibilities), the more it was forced to rely on Dan-
ish experts, since it almost completely lacked its own staff (Dahl, 2003).
The Greenland Home Rule Act of 1979 was the product of a compromise, and was 
viewed as a political success and a model for the termination of colonial domination. 
Its adoption was supported by a definite majority in the Danish parliament, and of vot-
ers in a referendum in Greenland. For over twenty years, the Act was not significantly 
amended. Two models for the further development of relations with the mother state 
emerged in late 20th century. One argued that the Act had to be reviewed and adapted to 
the changing situation; the other argued that a completely new model of Greenlandic-
Danish relations was needed. The former concept was favored on the island.
1 Significantly, Jakob Janussen expressed his view before huge natural resources were discov-
ered in Greenland.
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The final report of the Commission was unanimously adopted without dissenting 
opinions and presented to the local parliament on April 11, 2003. Importantly, the 
Commission deemed that Greenlanders had fulfilled all the conditions established in 
the decolonization process for a territory to cope with the full right of self-determina-
tion, as understood in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
In this context, it was primarily indicated that Greenland:
is an overseas territory of the Kingdom of Denmark ( – salt water theory2);
has a population with its own language, separate history and sense of national identity; –
enjoys a special position within the Kingdom of Denmark (as evidenced by the  –
following, to name a few: Greenland leaving the EEC, membership of regional 
organizations, symbols of independence: the flag, anthem and post office);
has experienced a long period of colonial rule, which is confirmed by Greenland  –
having been listed as a dependent territory as understood by the UN Charter (Re-
port, 2003: 17).
The Commission also stressed the fact that, from the moment that the Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Denmark of 1953 came into force, Denmark consistently refuted 
the possibility of the secession of Greenland. It was emphasized that legal regulations 
provided for Greenlanders to be treated as a special people in the Kingdom of Den-
mark. The Commission believed that Denmark did not recognize the island’s residents 
as being a people as interpreted by the UN, thereby denying their right to self-determi-
nation (Report, 2003: 18).
The starting point for the Commission was to propose that a new agreement be 
founded on partnership within the Kingdom of Denmark. Discussing the reasons ne-
cessitating the adoption of new regulations on the relationship, the Commission started 
with the progressive integration of Denmark into the European Union, as well as glo-
balization. The proposal drafted by the Commission gained the working title Partner-
ship Treaty Concerning Greenland’s Self-Governance. The document was founded on 
the following:
mutual respect resulting from the  – equality of both partners (emphasis – TB);
Greenland being recognized as a subject of international law; –
acknowledging that Greenlanders should have the right to self-determination ( – Re-
port, 2003: 19–20).
Profound changes were proposed in the field of the economy, which should pursue 
greater self-sufficiency. The Commission described the economic relations between 
Denmark and Greenland at the time in terms of a “dependence economy.” It was em-
phasized that the subsidies would have to be considerably reduced in the near future. 
2 The salt water theory, or blue water theory, says that the right to self-determination in the 
framework of decolonization can only be granted to non-self-governing overseas territories. This 
theory is based on Resolution 1541 (XV) of the UN General Assembly of December 15, 1960 which 
defined a non-self-governing territory as “a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct 
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it;” see: Principles Which Should Guide 
Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called 
for under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, 15 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), UN 
Doc. A/4684 (1960), in: Documents on autonomy and minority rights, (ed.) H. Hannum, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993, pp. 24–26.
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The necessity of Greenland opening up to the outside world and actively seeking trad-
ing partners other than Denmark was also highlighted. The identified shortcomings 
of the island’s economy mentioned the reliance on the export of raw materials or low 
value-added products, a relatively high proportion of low-skilled workers in the work-
force and the import of numerous products which could be manufactured domestically. 
The Commission stressed the necessity of restructuring the expenditure of the public 
sector to make it consistent with the wealth of society. The long-term goal for Green-
land was identified as achieving full economic independence.
The next part of the Report discussed matters of foreign policy and defense. The 
authors of the Report emphasized that it was of utmost importance for Greenland to be 
more independent in its foreign policy, in particular in matters of key importance for the 
development of the Greenlandic economy – fishing, hunting, environmental protection, 
tourism, transportation and trade. The fact that – being part of the Kingdom of Den-
mark – Greenland is a NATO member was indicated. According to the Commission, this 
meant that Greenland should be provided direct and unrestricted access to information 
on security. The Commission also supported the idea of introducing compulsory mili-
tary service or alternative service for young Greenlanders.
The final part of the Report addressed matters of language. The Home Rule Act of 
1978 stipulated that Greenlandic (kalaallisut) was the principal langue on the island, 
whereas Danish must be “thoroughly” taught. The Commission resolved that kalaal-
lisut should be both the principal and the official language of Greenland. At the same 
time, it urged for greater linguistic tolerance, which especially concerned the education 
sector, in which teaching at the post-elementary level was to a large extent based on 
materials written in Danish. It was stressed that a poor command of Danish (or another 
language apart from Greenlandic) might impede an individual’s opportunities in terms 
of university education and the pursuit of a professional career.3 The possibility of us-
ing both languages in parliamentary debates was also advocated.
The Report of the Commission on Self-Governance was adopted in its entirety by 
the parliament of Greenland in November 2003. The analysis of this document dem-
onstrates that it primarily addresses the internal situation in Greenland and the matters 
largely covered by the powers already granted to the local government. The authors of 
the Report both urged Greenland to reevaluate its relations with Denmark (for instance 
in the field of economy, foreign policy and defense policy) and encouraged the island 
to use the powers that had already been given to Greenlanders.
tHe act on Greenland Self-GoVernment (2009)
In order to continue elaborating on Greenlandic proposals, a decision was passed on 
June 21, 2004 to establish a Greenlandic-Danish Self-Government Commission.4 
3 This issue remains valid even today: Ulrik P. Gad stresses that it is extremely difficult to find 
employment in the public sector in Greenland for someone speaking only kalaallisut, because “the 
system speaks Danish;” see: Gad, 2017b: 111.
4 The Commission was composed of representatives appointed by the Danish and Greenlandic 
governments respectively, the academia and external experts.
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A jointly drafted scope of authority of the Commission envisaged that it would work 
out a proposal for a new agreement between Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark, 
taking into account the responsibilities already taken over by the autonomous authori-
ties of the island. The new agreement was agreed to be firmly entrenched in the status 
quo, whereby Greenland was deemed to be part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The 
Commission commenced operations in September 2004 and reached its conclusion 
on April 17, 2008, by submitting a draft of a new Act on Greenland Self-Government. 
A referendum on adopting this document was held in Greenland on November 25, 
2008; 75.54% of residents voted to increase the responsibilities of Greenland, 23.57% 
were against, and turnout was 71.96%. New regulations came into force on June 21, 
2009 (Act, 2009).
The Act enables Greenland to take over a further 33 fields of responsibility, which 
were divided into two categories, with respect to time. Category one encompasses the 
fields which would be transferred to the Greenland authorities at a point in time fixed 
by them and includes:
a) industrial injury compensation;
b) the remaining areas under the health care area;
c) road traffic;
d) law regarding property and obligations;
e) commercial diving.
The other list of responsibilities itemized the fields that would be transferred after 
negotiations with the relevant authorities of the Kingdom of Denmark, namely:
 1) the prison and probation service;
 2) passports;
 3) the police and prosecution service;
 4) administration of justice, including the establishment of courts of law;
 5) criminal law;
 6) the foreigners and border controls;
 7) legal capacity;
 8) family law;
 9) succession law;
10) law practice;
11) the weapons area;
12) radio-based maritime emergency and security services;
13) radio communications;
14) the company, accounting and auditing area;
15) the food and veterinary area;
16) aviation;
17) intellectual property;
18) copyright;
19) shipwreck, wreckage, and degradation of depth;
20) security at sea;
21) ship registration and maritime matters;
22) charting;
23) buoyage, lighthouses and pilotage area;
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24) the marine environment;
25) financial regulation and supervision;
26) the mineral resources area;
27) the working environment;
28) meteorology (Act, 2009).
Importantly, the areas indicated in the Schedule are not exclusive and the authori-
ties of Denmark and Greenland may agree to expand this list by adding further fields 
of responsibility.
The most significant regulations pertain to the future status of the island. Chapter 
8 of the Act on Self-Government contains an explicit statement that the decision re-
garding Greenland’s independence will be taken by the people of Greenland. This will 
mean that the governments of Denmark and Greenland will commence negotiations 
to work out an agreement to this end. Having been adopted by the Inatsisartut (parlia-
ment of Greenland) and endorsed by a referendum in Greenland, the agreement should 
be concluded with the consent of the Folketing (Danish parliament), pursuant to Art. 
19 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark.5 The details of the independence 
process will thus be jointly agreed by the authorities of Greenland and Denmark. In-
terestingly, the Act stipulates that independence will imply that Greenland assumes 
sovereignty over the territory of the island. According to Wilson, this provision should 
be interpreted as requiring Greenland to show both the will to obtain independence 
and the potential to assume responsibility for the island. He further observes that, so 
far, the Greenlandic authorities have focused on the external aspects of sovereignty 
(or independence from other authorities) and paid much less attention to the internal 
aspect (actually performing the functions resulting from Greenland’s independence) 
(2017: 515).
Despite the undeniable importance of the 2009 agreement for the further advance-
ment of self-government in Greenland, it remains a domestic act (taking the form of 
a parliamentary act) regulating relations between the state and its component, albeit 
a specific one. This means that, at least theoretically, the responsibilities vested in 
the authorities of this autonomous territory can be unilaterally revoked at any time 
(Sagan, Serzhanova, Wapińska, 2014: 126). Yet it would be difficult for this to occur 
in practice, given current Danish-Greenlandic relations, the more so as the preamble 
of the Act states that the agreement is concluded between the Danish and Greenlandic 
governments as “equal partners.”
The new regulations have not had a significant impact on responsibilities in the 
fields of foreign affairs and defense policy.6 The Greenlandic government has the right 
to negotiate and conclude international agreements with foreign states and internation-
al organizations which entirely concern Greenland and exclusively relate to the scope 
of responsibilities that the island authorities have already taken over. Nevertheless, the 
government of Denmark should be notified about the intention to commence such talks 
5 Pursuant to § 19, “[t]he King shall act on behalf of the Realm in international affairs, but, ex-
cept with the consent of the Folketing,the King shall not undertake any act whereby the territory of 
the Realm shall be increased or reduced,” Konstytucja, 1953.
6 Greenland was granted extended privileges to participate in foreign affairs in 2003 by virtue of 
the Itilleq Declaration, cf. Brańka, 2012.
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and their progress. The same applies to the Danish government – the local government 
should always be notified if Denmark commences negotiations on international agree-
ments which are of “particular importance” for Greenland. Additionally, before such 
agreements are concluded or terminated, they must be submitted to the Greenlandic 
government for comments. If Denmark signs an international agreement without the 
consent of the local government of Greenland, this should, as far as possible, have no 
impact on Greenland. Regarding internal affairs, Article 14 introduces a novel regula-
tion whereby Greenland may join international organizations (along with Denmark 
or in its own name), provided that this is consistent with the status of Greenland. The 
application, however, should be submitted by the Danish government at the request of 
the Greenlandic government. As requested by Greenland, Greenlandic advisors may 
be appointed to the diplomatic missions of the Kingdom of Denmark to protect Green-
land’s interests.
Pursuant to the Act, kalaallisut is the only official language and the Danish lan-
guage, unlike in the 1978 Act, is not mentioned at all. It is clear that the ruling coalition 
is seeking to strengthen the local language and, by this token, entrench national iden-
tity. The idea of replacing Danish with English as an official language of Greenland7 
has also emerged in political discourse. Danish is perceived in Greenland as a colonial 
language, whereas – due to the events of World War II – English is viewed as a lan-
guage that opens the island up to the outside (Gad, 2017a: 117).
polItIcal dIScource and Independence In Greenland
Whereas the Report did not address complete sovereignty as one of the options, from 
the late 1990s, leading Greenlandic politicians increasingly pressed for full indepen-
dence for the island. As early as 2003, the Minister for Self-Governance, Jørgen Wæver 
Johansen from the Siumut party announced that a referendum on Greenlandic indepen-
dence should be organized by 2006 (Greenland vote, 2003). Josef Motzfeldt, leader of 
the Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party spoke in a similar vein: “We want to be recognized as 
citizens under international law. We would like to make independent decisions about 
our resources, run an independent foreign policy and defend our interests without hav-
ing to ask Copenhagen for an opinion every single time” (Niepodległość, 2003).
The rise of independence sentiments is clearly noticeable in the evolution of the 
platforms of political parties, six of which currently operate on the political scene of 
Greenland.
Founded in 1977, Siumut (Forward) is the oldest party. With the exception of the 
2009 elections, Siumut has ruled Greenland since the island became autonomous. This 
social democratic political party advocates a gradual expansion of the responsibilities 
of the local authorities until Greenland becomes independent. It is beyond doubt that 
Siumut has had the greatest influence on the direction of development of Greenland 
in recent decades. A liberal conservative party, Atassut (Feeling of Community) has 
traditionally opted for maintaining close relations with Denmark and re-integration 
7 After a debate in Inatsisartut it was resolved to introduce English to first grade in elementary 
schools alongside Danish.
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into the European Union. At present, a shift towards support for greater independence 
of the island can be noted. The party mainly attracts residents of smaller localities. 
The Inuit Ataqatigiit (Community of the People) is a socialist party demanding the 
abandonment of any formal relations with Denmark and the establishment of closer 
ties with the residents of Northern Canada and Alaska. Therefore, in order to ensure 
the necessary income for the island, the party is in favor of opening the Greenlandic 
market to foreign companies, especially in the mining sector, with the exception of 
uranium mining. A center-right party Demokraatit (Democrats) was founded in 2002 
by a former member of Siumut – Per Berthelsen. A large proportion of party leaders 
are of Danish origin. It takes a cautious approach to independence and stresses the 
necessity of preparing Greenland for this eventuality, by, among other things, develop-
ing the education sector and increasing the economic independence of Greenland. The 
most left-wing party and, at the same time, one that advocates full independence of 
Greenland most explicitly is the Inuit Party, founded in 2013 after a schism in Inuit 
Ataqatigiit. A centrist party, Partii Naleraq, is the youngest party, which was founded 
in 2014 by a former member of Siumut, Hans Enoksen, Prime Minister of Greenland 
from 2002–2009.
The rhetoric of independence prevailed in the 2002 election campaign so strongly 
that none of the significant political parties denounced the idea of independence. At the 
time, the question was not whether to pursue independence, but rather when to obtain 
it and under what conditions. Yet none of the parties supported the idea of obtaining 
independence over a short period of time. Therefore, the election campaign focused on 
the challenges that Greenland would have to face in order to achieve actual economic 
independence and, on this basis, pursue further political responsibilities. The main 
topics addressed in this context revolved around the need to reform education, combat 
social problems, support the Greenlandic language and solve the recurrent problem of 
ensuring adequate access to and level of services to residents of small towns and vil-
lages scattered around the vast expanses of the island.
The 2009 election was won by the Inuit Ataqatigiit, which won 43.7% of votes 
and removed Siumut from power for the first time since 1979. Beyond doubt, the Inuit 
Ataqatigiit was the strongest supporter of full independence at the time. Its success 
should not be linked exclusively to its call for independence, though, but rather to 
Greenlandic society having grown tired of the scandals involving corruption, nepotism 
and the wasting of public funds associated with Siumut (Auchet, 2011: 963).
The political campaigns in 2013 and 2014 were dominated primarily by the mat-
ters of mining mineral resources in Greenland. The election in March 2013 was won 
by Siumut, and Aleqa Hammond was appointed as the first female Prime Minister of 
Greenland. The formerly ruling Inuit Ataqatigiit, which encouraged increased open-
ness to foreign investment, suffered a narrow defeat, but – symptomatically – won 
a majority of votes in the capital of Greenland, Nuuk. This is understandable, since 
Greenlandic fishermen and hunters felt both cast aside and threatened by the vision of 
the island’s development which was unconcerned with their traditional occupations. 
Residents of the largest city in Greenland, in turn, felt more convinced of the benefits 
to be gained from Greenland opening up to the outside, which could already be seen 
in the rapid development of Nuuk. Some former IA followers shifted their support to 
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the newly-founded Partii Inuit, which was also highly critical of excessively generous 
regulations pertaining to foreign entities. For instance, Siumut was against the Large-
Scale Act,8 adopted in December 2012 under the rule of the IA. The most controversial 
provision of this regulation enables foreign investors to employ cheaper workers from 
outside Greenland. The Siumut leader, Aleqa Hammond, criticized the policy of the 
Prime Minister from IA, going as far as to say that “People feel that the prime minister 
speaks on behalf of investors from outside” (Scrutton, 2013).
Just nineteen months later, another parliamentary election was held in Greenland 
(in 2014). This was the aftermath of Aleqa Hammond stepping down as Prime Minister 
after a scandal caused by reports that private flights and accommodation for the Prime 
Minister and her family members, costing DKK 106,363 (ca. EUR 14,300), were paid 
for from state funds. Despite a huge scandal, Siumut won the elections on November 
28, 2014 once again. The party was headed by an ex-policeman, Kim Kielsen, who 
took the office of Prime Minister. In order to form a stable parliamentary majority, Siu-
mut entered into a coalition with the Atassut and Demokraatit parties. Their political 
agreement was entitled Community – Security – Development. Interestingly, the only 
thing these parties shared was their joint ambition to lift the ban on the extraction of 
radioactive resources in Greenland.9 On the eve of the election, Kim Kielsen ensured 
investors that they “can rely on our commitment to resource extraction” and his party 
seeks to create “a secure, stable, long-term investment environment” (Crouch, 2014).
Table 1
the 2014 election results in Greenland
parties Votes % of votes mandaty
Siumut 10,108 34.3 11
Inuit Ataqatigiit 9,783 33.2 11
Democrats 3,469 11.8 4
Partii Naleraq 3,423 11.6 3
Atassut 1,919 6.5 2
Partii Inuit 477 1.6 0
Inni 22 0.1 0
turnout 72.9%
Source: Qinersineq, http://qinersineq.gl/default.aspx?electionGuid=b0578019-
e04f-4cde-92fa-6a3355cd383d& language=en-GB (12.12.2016).
Significantly, in the 2014 election, more attention was given to economic matters 
than to independence, focusing on the diversification of Greenlandic economy and 
increasing proceeds from fishing or developing tourism, to name just a few. This was 
more than understandable given the problems Greenland was facing at the time. In 
2013, Greenland’s GDP dropped by 1.9%. On top of that, just before the election, 
Finance Minister Vittus Qujaukitsoq had to announce highly disconcerting statis-
tics about the economy of Greenland. The budget deficit in 2014 reached DKK 275 
million, where a budget surplus of DKK 21 million had been forecast (Yurtaslan, 
8  For more on Large-Scale Act see: https://www.plesner.com/insights/artikler/2013/10/the%20
large-scale%20projects%20act?sc_lang=da-DK (21.12.2017).
9  See section Greenland’s mineral resources below.
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2014). Whichever party was to win the election, economic matters had to come to 
the forefront.
The coalition formed in 2014 did not last very long. In October 2016, the gov-
ernment was restructured significantly and Siumut turned to the opposition for coop-
eration. In this way, a highly robust coalition was formed by Siumut, IA and Partii 
Naleraq.10 In the 2014 election, these parties collected a total of over 79% of votes, 
which translated to 25 out of 31 parliamentary seats. The manifestos of these parties 
are relatively similar. The very first sentence of the coalition agreement, titled Equality 
– Security – Development, directly declares that Greenland has chosen “an irreversible 
path towards independence,” and this process requires both political stability and na-
tional unity alike (Coalition, 2016). For the first time, the government was vested with 
the formal task of preparing the process of gaining independence.11
It is a paradox that the difference between the coalition members concerns one of 
the most sensitive issues addressed during the election campaign, namely uranium 
mining. The coalition agreement says that the parties will seek to ensure optimal con-
ditions to foster the development of the mining industry, thereby making the island 
attractive for foreign investors. Speaking about uranium mining, it was explicitly in-
dicated that both IA and Partii Naleraq were for maintaining the ban on mining its 
deposits, and Siumut supported uranium mining to the extent to which it does not have 
an adverse impact on public health and the natural environment of Greenland. To make 
10 The Partii Naleraq was established only two years after a faction within Siumut split away 
and formed its own party. The electoral performance of the party headed by H. Enosken (11.6% and 
3 seats) was the greatest surprise of the 2014 election.
11 This was symbolically manifested by the establishment of a new Ministry of Independence, 
Foreign Affairs and Agriculture.
Sovereignty
Association
Left
Partii Inuit
Inuit Ataqatigiit
Siumut
Atassut
DemokraatitPartii Naleraq
Right
Figure 1. Party system in Greenland
Source: U. P. Gad (2017a), National Identity Politics and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: Greenland, Denmark, 
and the European Union, Copenhagen, p. 24.
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the coalition possible, the parties resolved to postpone this contentious issue until it 
“becomes relevant to consider new applications concerning the potential extraction of 
uranium and other radioactive deposits” (Coalition…, 2016).
The coalition agreement did not address two sensitive matters in Greenlandic-Dan-
ish relations. One concerned continued work of the Reconciliation Commission docu-
menting the colonial past of Greenland under Danish rule; the other one – replacing 
Danish with English as the main foreign language taught in schools (Breum, 2016).
Although no date was indicated in the coalition agreement as to when the divorce 
with Denmark would take place, in April 2017, the Greenlandic government appointed 
a seven-strong Constitutional Commission. Its task was to draft the declaration of in-
dependence and a preliminary version of the new constitution. The original timeframe 
of 2–3 years was shortened and now the Commission is scheduled to present the re-
sults of its work by the end of 2018 (Finne, 2016).
The majority of Greenlanders are for regaining independence. A survey was con-
ducted in December 2016, which showed that 64% of respondents found the island’s 
independence to be of “great importance” or of “importance,” while it was “insig-
nificant” for 24% of respondents and 12% had no opinion on this matter (McGwin, 
2016). Interestingly, the supporters of independence prevailed in every age group, but 
proportion of individuals supporting independence rose in correlation with the age of 
the respondents, reaching 70% in the 60–69 age bracket. The smallest proportion of 
advocates of independence was found among young people; in the 18–29 age bracket 
56% declared their support for independence while as many as 23% were undecided. 
It is highly significant, however, that the survey questions did not mention the possible 
outcome of Greenland losing Danish subsidies in the case of gaining independence. 
For the sake of comparison, the residents of another autonomous territory of Denmark, 
the Faroe Islands, were asked the second question, which resulted in 48% of the re-
spondents rejecting independence if it was associated with losing Danish financing 
(McGwin, 2016).
So far, Greenland has not discussed the details of the independence process, its 
timeframe and, primarily, the profits and losses associated with it when compared to 
other possible scenarios, such as the formation of an association or federation (Wilson, 
2017: 516). This may be the explanation for why even the pro-independence Greenlan-
dic politicians see Greenland obtaining full independence in 20–30 years’ time. Inde-
pendence remains to be a collective aspiration rather than a precisely defined political 
aim (Wilson, 2017: 518).
danISH-GreenlandIc relatIonS
One of the greatest challenges in present Danish-Greenlandic relations concerns fi-
nancing of the autonomy. Since autonomy was established, Denmark has been sub-
sidizing it on an annual basis. At present, pursuant to Art. 5 of the Act of Greenland 
Self-Government from 2009, Greenland receives ca. DKK 3.7 billion from Denmark,12 
12 Pursuant to the Act on Self-Government, the subsidy amounts to DKK 3,439.6 million (as of 
2009) and is index-linked on the basis of a wage-price ratio. In 2016 it was DKK 3,682.3 million.
118	 Tomasz	BRAŃKA	
which accounts for nearly 25% of the GDP of Greenland (as of 2017). The matter of 
finance may become essential in the campaign for independence. Some economists, 
including Professor Martin Paldam from the University of Århus, have long believed 
that aid from Denmark is used inefficiently and the economy of the island relies exces-
sively on these subsidies. Apart from allegations that public resources are wasted, it is 
also frequently argued that Danish aid is pointless, since it impairs the competitiveness 
of Greenlandic economy (Paldam, 1994; Mørkøre, 1999).
One of the challenges to be tackled by the government of Greenland in the near 
future concerns reforming the public sector. At present, public administration employs 
over 10,000 people out of the total 26,000 people in the labor market. This is especially 
revealing when compared to the leading sectors of fishing, hunting and agriculture, 
which employ slightly over 4,000 Greenlanders (Greenland in Figures, 2017: 16). 
As early as the 1980s, Jens Dahl identified the problem of what he called the “exces-
sive expansion of self-government” (Dahl, 1986). Several decades have passed since, 
but this seems to be a most apt diagnosis of the disease Greenland has long suffered 
from (Lytthans, 1999: 115–125). The Greenlandic administration apparatus is mod-
eled on the Danish administration, a pattern which clearly works in Europe but which 
was implemented on the world’s largest island without the necessary modifications: 
“the character, power and scope of the activities of the Greenlandic administration are 
primarily the product of Danish presence and not the outcome of the development of 
social classes” (Dahl, 2003: 135). To a large extent, this situation results from Danish 
policy in the 1960s. Danish reformers were guided by the idea of Greenlanders keep-
ing their traditional occupations (hunting and fishing), while the Danish were to supply 
professional clerical staff employed wherever university education and specialization 
were indispensable. In the mid-20th century this policy was perceived as protecting the 
traditional lifestyle, but it actually resulted in excessive paternalism (Lyck, 1997: 21; 
Grydehøj, 2016).
The excessive expansion of administration in Greenland can be seen in several 
dimensions. Firstly, a significant proportion of the highest administrative offices on 
the island are held by Danes, or by people educated in Denmark. The whole apparatus 
would be unable to function without this “imported knowledge.” Secondly, the size 
and horizontal structure of the administration are way beyond what Greenland needs; 
even small villages have extensive public services. Thirdly, all this administration is 
not financed by Greenland itself, but is dependent on Danish aid. The only solution, 
suggested by Dahl and still valid, is to construct (restructure) a Greenlandic admin-
istration which is adapted to its actual needs (Karlsson, 2006: 33). During a debate 
on Danish-Greenlandic relations held in the Folketing in 2017, discussing the mat-
ter of the possible full independence of the island, the Danish Prime Minister Hans 
Løkke Rasmussen went as far as to say that the autonomous Greenlandic authorities 
found it difficult to exercise the powers they had already taken over (McGwin, 2017b). 
Greenland is beginning a long-awaited, but also controversial, discussion on whether 
to maintain or slash the number of municipalities and diversify the prices for basic 
goods and services in relation to the location of a given place. Provided that infrastruc-
ture is adequately developed, some municipalities would be able to ensure growth and 
employment in the fishing and tourism sectors, among others. Yet the territories which 
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lack the essential development conditions will pose a challenge. It has been suggested 
that their residents should be relocated to other parts of the island, but such proposals 
arouse profound discontent amongst local populations (McGwin, 2017c).
The analysis of the standpoint taken by the Kingdom of Denmark with respect to 
Greenlandic independence has evolved. The government in Copenhagen has accepted 
the fact that Greenland (and the Faroe Islands) has taken a gradual, but most likely ir-
reversible, path towards independence.
Delivering their annual speeches inaugurating the sessions of Folketing, the Danish 
Prime Ministers traditionally address the matter of relations between Denmark and the 
autonomous territories. Visions of how these relations may develop differ, but the gov-
ernment of Denmark believes that the future of Greenland and the Faroe Islands should 
be decided by their residents. The Danish government understands the postulates sub-
mitted by the islanders, in particular when proposed changes do not undermine the 
unity of the Kingdom of Denmark. Recently, the relations between Denmark and the 
autonomous territories seem to be governed by the “multiplicity in unity” approach.
Speaking about modernizing self-governance in the Faroe Islands and Greenland in 
2001, Prime Minister A. F. Rasmussen stressed that his government sought to maintain 
the unity of the Kingdom as a “community of three equal peoples” (Prime, 2001). He 
believed that the historical, cultural and family relations between Denmark and the 
autonomous territories are strong enough to make it “natural” to stay together, help-
ing one another.” He also stressed that the Kingdom of Denmark is not founded on 
coercion and cannot “become a straitjacket” (Prime, 2003). After the Self-Government 
Act, whose very preamble indicates a pro-independence direction, came into force, 
Copenhagen began to emphasize the benefits of collaboration within the Kingdom. 
It was emphasized that the Danish community was a unique solution which ensured 
greater power and protection in the face of economic challenges (Prime, 2014). In 
response to Greenland appointing a commission in charge of drafting a Constitution, 
Denmark expressed its profound understanding of the island’s desires, but stated that 
the regulations in the future constitution would have to conform to principles binding 
in the Kingdom of Denmark (Prime, 2015; Prime, 2017).
Whereas the need to maintain the unity of the Kingdom is repeatedly stressed, it is 
also emphasized that the self-determination of peoples is a fundamental principle and 
that the Danish community ensures freedom of choice (Prime, 2007; Prime, 2008). 
Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt made it clear that, in spite of the bonds which 
tie Denmark and Greenland and the Faroe Islands together, “naturally, we are also 
three different countries” (Prime, 2014). It was also stated that it is the Greenlandic 
people “who determine the future relations with Denmark” (Prime, 2011).
It is an official approach taken by the highest representatives of the Kingdom of 
Denmark to stress the necessity and benefits of maintaining a ternary Kingdom while 
simultaneously acknowledging the identity of Greenland (and the Faroe Islands). Very 
clear references to Greenland’s “ingratitude” towards Denmark, in particular concern-
ing financial resources for the island, frequently appear in public discourse. Danes 
view these subsidies as a certain kind of “charity” (Grydehøj, 2016: 106) and, there-
fore, interpret the postulates of separation from the motherland as disloyalty at best. 
According to Grydehøj, Denmark would like “Greenlanders to love them for present-
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ing Greenland with opportunities for self-sufficiency and independence, but Denmark 
would rather Greenlanders not grasp these opportunities” (ibid.). The problem then is 
not the subsidies for the island, which amount to DKK 3.7 billion per year, but Green-
land’s lack of appreciation for this gesture.
A question arises here as to what benefits Denmark gets from retaining Greenland 
within its realm. Taking a broader perspective, it turns out that the Danish subsidy 
should not necessarily be viewed as an act of pure charity.
Firstly, Denmark is Greenland’s main trade partner and the vast majority of goods 
bought by Greenlanders come from Denmark: the value of imports brought from the 
homeland amounted to USD 427 million in 2016, accounting for over 72% of total 
imports to Greenland. Additionally, Greenland hosts a significant number of Danish la-
borers with temporary contracts, who will spend at least part of their earnings in Den-
mark. Greenland is therefore dealing with the process named by Grydehøj the “perma-
nent leakage of capital back to the motherland” (2016: 108). Yet geopolitical benefits 
prevail over financial matters. It is thanks to Greenland that Denmark is legitimized as 
a member of the Arctic club. Thanks to its overseas territories, Denmark is connected 
with a dense network of Atlantic and Arctic ties, is a member of numerous international 
organizations and is represented at different international forums (Brańka, 2012). Hav-
ing Greenland has recently allowed Denmark to become a crucial actor in international 
relations, able to take an active part in talks on the strategic role of the Arctic. This is 
about such crucial matters as the security of this region, scientific research, transporta-
tion, fisheries, and climate change, as well as indigenous populations.
The analysis of relations between Denmark and Greenland justifies the conclusion 
that the former has come to terms with the possible declaration of independence by the 
latter, which is currently treated as an equal partner. This is not to say that Copenhagen 
would happily welcome this scenario. The argument that ‘it’s better to be together’ 
dominates in the discourse in Denmark. Nevertheless, one can hardly avoid discussion 
on the possibility of independence, especially given the work on the constitution that 
has commenced in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Although both these documents 
will apply only locally, they are a clear manifestation of the path taken by the main 
political forces in these areas.
Another interesting matter concerns the question of future Danish-Greenlandic rela-
tions. Some authors urge for these relations to be profoundly remodeled (Gad, 2017a), 
thereby abandoning the postcolonial rhetoric of ‘donor’ (Danish subsidies) and ‘re-
cipient’ (Greenlanders). The continued existence of a ternary Kingdom of Denmark is 
viewed very differently on the continent and on the island, and these two perceptions 
seem to be hardly reconcilable. The attitude of Danish ‘responsibility’ for the develop-
ment of the island prevails in Denmark, often employing the metaphor of mother and 
child (Gad, 2017a: 111–112). As self-government develops in Greenland and takes 
over further responsibilities and tasks, Greenland finds it increasingly difficult to ac-
cept such a hierarchical structure. Whereas the islanders do not reject relations with 
Denmark, at least in the short term, they would like to build their future relations with 
it as an equal partner.13
13 As confirmed in the preamble to the Act on Self-Government of 2009, among other things. 
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Greenland’S mIneral reSourceS aS an (uncertaIn)  
foundatIon of Independence
The Arctic is one of the last territories that remain to be explored and exploited. A race 
for access to its deposits of mineral resources started in the 2000s. The U.S. Geological 
Survey estimated then that the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s untapped reserves 
of natural gas and crude oil (13% and 30% respectively) (Gauthier, Bird, 2011: 1175). 
In this context, global attention has also focused on Greenland.14
The Self-Government Act provides for revenue from the extraction of mineral re-
sources in Greenland to be managed by the Greenlandic authorities. Chapter 3 of the 
same document also stipulates that once the Greenlandic authorities achieve a certain 
level of income from this source, Danish subsidies will be reduced.15 When the subsidy 
is reduced to zero, the government of Greenland and the government of Denmark will 
commence negotiations on future economic relations (Act, 2009).
Many authors forecast that the natural resources of Greenland will ensure the is-
land’s economic independence from Denmark, thereby removing the greatest obstacle 
on the path to full independence. The significance of resources such as crude oil, natu-
ral gas, zinc ores, gold and diamonds has typically been stressed. Recently, however, 
more attention has been paid to access to rare earth metals and the extraction of ura-
nium, which causes the greatest controversy. The large Greenlandic resources of rare 
earth metals,16 which are in very high demand, could potentially make Greenland one 
of the crucial players in this sector, especially as climate change and global warming 
are likely to facilitate access to and exploitation of these resources (Boersma, Foley, 
2014; Stephens, 2013; Borgerson, 2013).
This optimism is toned down by analyses indicating that the extraction of natural 
resources may contribute to the development of the island, but may not automatically 
lead to independence, as this process is much more complicated and multidimensional 
(Wilson, 2017).
According to Wilson, at present, there is only one mine operating in Greenland. It 
opened in May 2017, and its deposits are forecast to last for nine years. Another mine 
is under construction, and there are no binding decisions concerning other projects. 
The plans to explore hydrocarbons look even less optimistic: nine out of the sixteen 
licensed entities are withdrawing their operations, and the remaining ones are not plan-
ning trial drills in the foreseeable future (Wilson, 2017: 513). In 2016, there were no 
offers submitted to search for crude oil over a period of ten years in the region of the 
14 Natural resources were mined in Greenland as early as in mid-19th century. Due to technical 
limitations and depletion of the resources, the last mine in Maamorilik was closed down in 1990, and 
Greenland has become an island without mines.
15 If revenue from mineral resource activities in Greenland exceeds DKK 75 million in a given 
year, the Danish subsidy will be reduced by an amount corresponding to half the revenue which ex-
ceeds DKK 75 million in the following year, see Act, 2009, Chapter 3, Item 8.
16 The demand for rare earth metals is growing as they are indispensable in the production of 
modern electronic devices, electric cars and wind turbines, to name a few. The current supply of these 
resources was generated nearly exclusively by China, which was estimated to provide ca. 80–90% 
(105,000 out of 124,000 tons obtained globally). Cf. https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/com-
modity/rare_earths/mcs-2016-raree.pdf (3.12.2017).
122	 Tomasz	BRAŃKA	
Disco Bay and the adjacent Nuussua Peninsula. The same happened in 2017, during 
an auction for permits in the region of the Baffin Bay. This is unlikely to change in 
2018 (McGwin, 2017a). The strategy of mining crude oil and natural gas 2014–201817 
(Greenland’s oil, 2017) envisaged that one to two new offshore drilling projects will 
be conducted annually. While the deposits in eastern Greenland arouse greater hopes 
there have been no new drills in western Greenland since 2011 (Kristiansen, 2016).
A report was drawn up by the Leett Law Firm, the Danish Centre for the Environ-
ment and Energy and PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2013. It concluded that the taxes paid 
by the companies extracting mineral resources will not have a considerable impact on 
the budget of Greenland (Larsen, Juhl, 2016). A similar conclusion follows also from 
the 2014 analysis by scholars from the University of Copenhagen and University of 
Greenland. The proceeds generated by the mining industry will surely have an ad-
vantageous influence on the development of the island, but they will not be able to 
replace the whole Danish subsidy. For this to happen, Greenland would have to launch 
24 Large-Scale Projects18 in the mining sector by 2040. According to the authors of the 
report, this is an “unrealistic” scenario (To	the	benefit, 2014: 19). The Danish newspa-
per Politkien commented on the report, concluding that “thirteen experts have ruined 
the dreams of Greenland’s independence” (Breum, 2017: 136).
The key reasons for investment decisions in the mining sector of Greenland slow-
ing down are as follows:
a) relatively low prices for raw materials;
b) high costs of labor and of the necessary investment;
c) lack of qualified labor force;
d) demanding climate on the island.
The existence of mineral resources in Greenland is unquestionable, even if their 
exact size and the technological feasibility of extracting them are uncertain. This does 
not mean, however, that the development of this sector will have a significant influence 
on the standard of living of the population, at least in the short term, or that it will au-
tomatically mean that the Danish subsidy can be given up. Studies have already shown 
that in order to make full use of potential resources, an appropriate workforce will have 
to be trained. Greenlanders have practically no experience in large-scale extraction of 
crude oil and other mineral resources. A number of different fields of life on the island 
will be transformed: new services will have to emerge, and infrastructure will have to 
expand. Given the lack of local workforce, workers will have to be brought in from 
the outside. This is the scenario envisaged by the authors of the Danish-Greenlandic 
report from 2014. They pointed to the risk of Greenlanders becoming a “minority in 
their own state” as investments develop (To	the	benefit, 2014: 23). In 2013, London 
Mining Plc announced its plans to build an iron ore mine in the vicinity of the Isua 
geological belt, 150 km away from the capital city of Nuuk, for USD 2.3 billion. The 
company estimated that ca. 3,000 workers would be employed in the construction of 
17 Greenland’s oil and mineral strategy 2014-2018, Government of Greenland, https://www.gov- 
min.gl/images/stories/about_bmp/publications/Greenland_oil_and_mineral_strategy_2014-2018_ 
ENG.pdf (12.12.2017).
18 The Greenlandic Large-Scale Projects Act defines large scale projects as those in excess of 
DKK 5 billion.
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the mine, only 10% of whom would be locals, while the rest were to come from China 
(Breum, 2015: 128).19 Another project, Kvanefjeld, envisages the construction of the 
most promising mine and a port, employing approximately 2,000 workers. This min-
ing facility is expected to offer permanent employment to ca. 800 workers, including 
300 locals (Walsh, 2017). Although the number of foreign workers does not seem very 
high in this case, this should be seen in relation to the quite small populations living in 
different regions of Greenland; there are approximately 1,400 people living at present 
in Naraq, near Kvanefjeld.
The development of the mining industry may harm the traditional sources of in-
come in Greenland, i.e. fishing and tourism. There is also the question of the influence 
of the new industries on the local culture and traditions, especially in the context of 
the inflow of outside workers. Finally, there are concerns about the capacity of the 
relatively small internal market of Greenland to absorb the profits generated by the 
forecast development of mining facilities.
In conclusion, it may be said that the advocates of Greenland’s opening its doors 
to external investors (and workers) argue that this would allow Greenland to reduce 
its financial dependence on Denmark and diversify its economy. The opponents stress 
the threat posed by the extraction of resources to the extremely sensitive natural en-
vironment of the Arctic and possible social costs. It therefore appears that the equa-
tion ‘proceeds from natural resources = independence’ is an oversimplification and 
the economy of Greenland requires more profound transformations, involving greater 
diversification, among other things (Wilson, 2017: 514).
Yet the greatest emotions raised during the parliamentary elections in 2013 and 
2014 were associated with the topic of the extraction of uranium and rare earth metals. 
From 1988, the Danish anti-nuclear policy also imposed a blanket ban on the extrac-
tion of radioactive minerals in Greenland (the so-called zero-tolerance policy).
The discussion on whether or not to abandon this ban began in Greenland. Prime 
Minister A. Hammond from Siumut argued that “we cannot have increasing unem-
ployment and growing costs of living when our economy is at a standstill. Therefore, 
we have to abandon the ‘zero tolerance for uranium’ policy right now” (Greenland 
votes…, 2013).20 After a heated debate, the local parliament decided by a single vote 
(15:14) to do away with the regulations from the 1980s and allow radioactive miner-
als21 to be mined. The question remained as to whether the Danish parliament should 
also approve these changes, in spite of the regulations in the Self-Government Act 
whereby the authorities of Greenland took over the extraction of mineral resources. 
One interpretation is that matters of defense and security are the responsibility of 
the central government, and mining uranium falls under this category. Additionally, 
the complex regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of 
EURATOM related to uranium exports and the extent to which they apply to Green-
land as an overseas territory of the European Union are also significant in this context 
19 The project was never implemented because London Mining Plc. went bankrupt. 
20 This matter gained prime importance in 2008, when an Australian company Greenland Miner-
als and Energy Ltd (GMEL) announced its intention to abandon its plans to mine rare earth metals in 
Kvanefjeldt unless it obtained a permission to extract uranium ore; see: Larsen, Juhl, 2016.
21 Nearly 400 people in Nuuk staged a protest against this decision; see: Breum, 2017: 161.
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(Freedman, 2017; Brańka, 2007). Having examined this issue, the Danish government 
announced that it would not block the decisions made by the parliament of Greenland 
(Jacobsen, 2014). In January 2016, the government of Denmark and government of 
Greenland signed a package of four agreements on future cooperation in the field of 
uranium mining and export, including matters of security and the supervision of dual-
use technology and products for military and civilian purposes (Denmark and Green-
land…, 2016).22
At present, the Kvanefjeld project in southern Greenland is attracting most atten-
tion. Its purpose is to extract rare earth metals,23 uranium and zinc. Importantly, it is 
practically impossible to mine valuable rare earth metals in this region without mining 
uranium ore. The deposits there are enormous. Using Australian JORC24 standards, 
they have been estimated at 1,010 million Mg. This would make it possible to operate 
a mining facility which would be the second largest manufacturer of rare earth met-
als and fifth largest manufacturer of uranium in the world.25 According to different 
estimates, it could operate for a period of 37 to 100 years (Stanowisko…, 2017). The 
project will be operated by an Australian company, Greenland Minerals and Energy 
Ltd (GMEL).
Such a huge investment project arouses concerns as to its impact on the natural 
environment. In March 2017, the Danish section of an environmental organization, 
NOAH Friends of the Earth, published its opinion on the environmental impact study 
of the Kvanefjeld project. The opinion was clearly negative, accusing the study of 
underestimating the amount of waste and radiation; another criticism concerns the 
idea of discharging liquid waste into the Taseq lake (Stanowisko, 2017), all the more 
so as the lake is too small and GMEL is planning to build two additional dams. Hav-
ing achieved its full production capacity, the mine would process three million tons 
of ore annually. Given the massive scale of this project, there are concerns about the 
risk of environmental contamination with radioactive and non-radioactive substances 
while, due to the low average content of uranium in the ore (0.0266%), the amount 
of uranium obtained will still be disproportionately small compared to environmental 
damage (Stanowisko, 2017).26
Today, it is generally agreed that the proceeds from the mining industry will not 
enable Greenland to become economically independent in the short term or give up 
the entire Danish subsidy. Conversely, Greenland might become dependent on foreign 
businesses instead and experience profound social transformations. Although Green-
22 To simplify the matter, it can be assumed that the agreement gave Greenland the right to mine 
uranium, but exports must be supervised by the Danish authorities.
23 Such as praseodymium, terbium and neodymium. 
24 Joint Ore Reserves Committee, see. http://www.jorc.org/.
25 Uranium deposits are estimated at 600,000 tons, the second largest after those in Australia. 
Deposits of rare earth metals are estimated at 11.1 million tons. However, Greenlandic resources may 
in fat be even larger, because the entire Ilimaussaq complex has not been examined in detail so far. 
See: Larsen, Juhl, 2016.
26 The risk of environmental damage is also indicated in a report drawn up by Jan Willem Storm 
van Leeuwen in 2014, see: Uranium	mining	at	Kvanefjeld, http://www.ecocouncil.dk/en/releases/ar-
ticles-pressreleases/chemicals-and-climate/2348-new-report-confirms-that-the-kvanefjeld-mining-
project-is-not-sustainable (18.12.2017).
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land lacks one of the basic foundations of an independent state, the support for its 
independence continues to be high, being the top issue on the political agenda. The 
changes introduced by the Self-Government Act are so profound that the Act has been 
dubbed a ‘provisional constitution’ for the period of Greenland forging its indepen-
dence (Sagan, Serzhanova, Wapińska, 2014: 130). The prevailing view is that the rapid 
severance of all contacts with Denmark could bring about a deterioration of the living 
standards of Greenlanders (or a drastic rise in taxes). This means that the matter under 
negotiation is not so much whether or not Greenland has the right to declare indepen-
dence (because this has been decided in the 2009 Self-Government Act, among other 
things), but rather if it should take this step. The independence of mini-states (Green-
land being one of them in terms of its population) does not ensure their greater influ-
ence in international relations. It remains an open question as to whether Greenland 
would be able to run a more effective foreign policy being an independent state in legal 
terms but having no Danish subsidy or diplomatic support.
Whatever the ultimate result of the current changes, the ongoing process of Green-
land building its increasing independence is almost a model example of a nation exer-
cising its right to self-determination, both in the internal and external sense.
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aBStract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of development of Greenland’s autonomy, 
especially vis-à-vis the Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009, which ensures that deci-
sions on the future status of the island will be made by the people of Greenland. Compared to 
other entities, Greenland is the only Arctic territory which can feasibly gain independence. This 
study also discusses the relations between Denmark and Greenland in terms of post-colonial re-
lations between the former metropolis/colonizer and the island, outlining also the discourse on 
independence in Greenland. The hypothesis posed in the paper is that the proceeds from mineral 
extraction will not enable Greenland to become economically independent and abandon Dan-
ish subsidies, and that the process of gaining sovereignty might result in Greenland becoming 
dependent on external powers which will have a considerable impact on social relations on the 
island. This means that the matter under negotiation is not so much whether or not Greenland 
has the right to declare independence, but rather if it should take this step.
Keywords: Greenland, Kingdom of Denmark, autonomy, self-determination, Arctic
GRENLANDIA – OD AUTONOMII KU (NIE)PODLEGŁOŚCI 
 
StreSZcZenIe
Artykuł stawia sobie za cel analizę dotychczasowego procesu rozwoju autonomii terytorialnej 
Grenlandii, szczególnie w kontekście Aktu o Samorządzie z 2009 r., w którym uzgodniono, że de-
cyzja o przyszłym statusie wyspy przynależeć będzie do narodu grenlandzkiego. W ujęciu porów-
nawczym, Grenlandia pozostaje w regionie Arktyki jedynym autonomicznym terytorium, które 
ma możliwość uzyskania niepodległości. Praca podejmuje także temat relacji Danii z Grenlandią, 
w kontekście pokolonialnych stosunków między dawną metropolią a wyspą, zarysowując również 
dyskurs niepodległościowy na największej wyspie świata. Postawiona hipoteza zakłada, że do-
chody z przemysłu wydobywczego nie umożliwią szybkiego uniezależnienia się ekonomicznego 
wyspy i całkowitej rezygnacji z duńskiej subwencji, a proces dochodzenia do niepodległości bę-
dzie niósł ryzyko uzależnienia się od sił zewnętrznych, znacząco wpływając na stosunki społeczne 
na wyspie. W konsekwencji, oznacza to, że na stole negocjacyjnym pozostaje nie tyle pytanie czy 
Grenlandia ma prawo ogłosić niepodległość, ale czy powinna na taki krok się zdecydować.
Słowa kluczowe: Grenlandia, Królestwo Danii, autonomia, samostanowienie, Arktyka
